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I. INTRODUCTION
If value pluralism is true, does it provide support for liberalism?
Isaiah Berlin famously thought that this question should be answered
affirmatively. Berlin’s protean idea has spawned an interesting
discussion in contemporary political theory, as a number of thinkers
have engaged with one or another aspect of the value pluralismliberalism connection. John Gray and John Kekes have, in quite
different ways, affirmed the idea of value pluralism while denying any
strong link between it and liberal political morality.1 On the other hand,
William Galston and George Crowder have provided comprehensive and
powerful expositions of liberalism claiming a supportive relationship
with value pluralism.2 This essay criticizes the view that value pluralism
provides philosophical support for liberalism. I have no objection to
register here against the terms of liberal political morality, or to the
general idea of identifying paths of philosophical support for it.3
However, I want to raise a number of questions about value pluralism in
its relation to liberalism, and about specific lines of argument advanced
by Crowder and Galston in support of their positive view of the
connection. These questions are critical in impact—at least if correct—
but do not proceed from a position advocating an alternative to the basic
terms of liberal political morality. My more modest aim is one of
provoking elaboration and clarification of certain key aspects of the
value pluralism-liberalism relation by means of questioning it.
After a few terminological preliminaries in Part II, I turn to two
primary tasks. First, in Part III, I raise questions that seem to me to
confront the basic logic of the connection between value pluralism and
liberalism. Second, in Part IV, I discuss at length the “argument from
diversity” articulated by George Crowder in support of the view that
value pluralism supports liberalism.4 This line of argument is only one
of a number that Crowder advances in support of that view, and so
doubts about its success do not necessarily implicate the other lines of
argument he pursues. However, the argument from diversity is a

1. See JOHN GRAY, ISAIAH BERLIN 61–62 (1996); JOHN KEKES, THE MORALITY OF
PLURALISM 199–203 (1993).
2. GEORGE CROWDER, ISAIAH BERLIN: LIBERTY AND PLURALISM 148–70 (2004);
GEORGE CROWDER, LIBERALISM AND VALUE PLURALISM 135–57 (2002) [hereinafter
CROWDER, LIBERALISM]; WILLIAM A. GALSTON, THE PRACTICE OF LIBERAL PLURALISM 154,
187 (2005) [hereinafter GALSTON, PRACTICE OF LIBERAL PLURALISM]; WILLIAM A. GALSTON,
LIBERAL PLURALISM: THE IMPLICATIONS OF VALUE PLURALISM FOR POLITICAL THEORY AND
PRACTICE 4 (2002) [hereinafter GALSTON, LIBERAL PLURALISM: IMPLICATIONS].
3. The argument here is thus not part of a more general antifoundationalism in
political theory.
4. CROWDER, LIBERALISM, supra note 2, at 135–59.
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particularly interesting and prevalent form of argument in defense of
liberalism—in the form of the “spatial” argument referred to later—and
hence, I trust, worth the extensive and exclusive attention given it here.
II. PRELIMINARIES
I want to start with a few definitions and analytical distinctions that
will prove helpful as a means of shorthand in the ensuing discussion.
First, as per my title, I want to think about the path between value
pluralism and liberalism, as opposed to thinking in terms of the path
from value pluralism to liberalism. The traffic of ideas runs both ways,
though it is common to think of the philosophy—value pluralism—as
foundational to, or “underneath,” liberalism. I do not view traffic from
liberalism to value pluralism as in need of regulation or restriction,
though I do affirm the traditional idea that the truth or falsity of a
philosophical thesis cannot be established by examining the political
implications of that thesis. But, like most of the political theorists who
think and write about the value pluralism-liberalism connection—
including Isaiah Berlin—I am not fundamentally interested in
conducting inquiry into the pure philosophical question of value
pluralism. Content, then, to proceed with thinking from the base of “if
value pluralism is correct, what follows for politics,” I am curious as
well about the traffic of ideas in the other direction. I will not pursue
that curiosity in this essay, but note here that value pluralism seems like
a philosophy of value especially well-suited to liberal political
arrangements, perhaps even to the point of sparking some suspicion that
it might, at the end of the day, appear to be essentially liberal political
arrangements dressed in the garb of value theory at the level of
philosophy. It might, that is, simply be liberalism redescribed, rather
than being a theory independent of liberalism that might support it. I am
curious about that possibility, though also disturbed at the possibility of
its truth. Still, I can recognize that thinkers like John Dewey and
Richard Rorty, certainly to be counted as friends if not champions of
liberalism, would not be at all disturbed by it, and would likely
recommend that we own up to it without apology, the sooner the better.5

5. John Dewey, Philosophy and Democracy, 21 U. CAL. CHRON. 39 (1919),
reprinted in JOHN DEWEY, THE POLITICAL WRITINGS 38 (Debra Morris & Ian Shapiro
eds., 1993); RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 44 (1989).
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Second, I want to make use of a simple but important shorthand
distinguishing two senses of the term value. One sense, the “D”-sense,
is purely descriptive. The D-values of a person—or more generally,
agent, including groups, societies, epochs, civilizations—refer to the
ends actually pursued in life by such agents. Values genuinely worthy
of being pursued, that is, genuine goods, have normative value, hence,
“N”-value. Whether descriptive values are morally worthy or good—
normative—values is an open question. Hence, D-values and N-values
are not necessarily the same.
The same difference can be applied to senses of the term pluralism.
D-pluralism is the sense of the word pluralism most often encountered in
writing about contemporary politics and culture. It refers to the
increasing social and cultural diversity, of many different types, that has
come to characterize modern societies in an increasingly globalized
world. D-pluralism is empirical, a fact about the way we live together
now. D-pluralism is celebrated by some, bemoaned by others, but
experienced by all. The idea of value pluralism is not about Dpluralism. Value pluralism tells us that value, objective value, is not
monistic but plural. It thus tells us something about (a) the form of
morality, and also something about (b) its rational character, namely
that it is not relativistic but is rather a type of objective moral realism. It
does not tell us anything about the actual N-values in the world, except
that they exist, that there is a plurality of them, and that there is not an
infinite amount of them. I assume that all value pluralists would accept
the difference between D-value and N-value, and the difference between
the ideas of D-pluralism and N-pluralism.
III. QUESTIONING THE BASIC CONNECTION
A. The Formality of N-Value in Value Pluralism
Value pluralists posit the existence of a plurality of N-values, but
ordinarily do not attempt to specify either (a) the number of N-values, or
(b) the substance of these N-values, however many there are. This is not
objectionable in and of itself. The formality of the idea does not prevent
us from using it to reflect systematically on important metalevel
questions regarding the nature of N-value, especially the question of
whether N-value is fundamentally monistic or plural. Indeed, the
formality of the idea positively contributes to the careful consideration
of such questions because it helps us not to lose sight of the
metaquestions should they become entangled with the substantive ethical
question of which substantive D-values are truly N-values. There will,
of course, be deep disagreement about that question, and not only
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disagreement about the question of whether N-value itself is monistic or
plural. Formality helps us to keep our disagreements straight.
But how far can we go with the purely formal ideal of N-value,
especially if we want to examine the relationship between the theory of
value and politics? A number of my queries in the next section are
derivative of that fundamental concern, and express in different ways a
doubt that value pluralism as such can deliver much support for liberal
political principles. Consider a particular problem that arises for the
value pluralist in this respect. The fact that there is a plurality of Dvalues in a society—say, seven—does not necessarily give us reason to
affirm a set of familiar liberties designed to facilitate choice amongst
these alternatives. If we treat all of these D-values as N-values, then it
seems true that the state would lack any obvious justification for limiting
the liberty of citizens to choose amongst them.6 But we cannot cross
that argumentative threshold without moving from the level of formality
to that of substantive judgment. This is a problem within the value
pluralist framework—and not merely the point that whether value
pluralism or an alternative like monism is the right philosophical view of
value is a question that cannot be definitively answered for now. That
much is obvious, although one could think that mere phenomenological
reflection upon human experience is enough to establish the truth of
value pluralism. I do not think it is. Value pluralism is an interpretation
of that experience, but so is monism, and indeed so is relativism. All
cannot be right, but experience itself is not enough to determine the
matter for us.
To return to the primary point: even from within the value pluralist
framework, we do not know how many D-values are N-values without
substantive argument about what is genuinely good and valuable.
Without that information, we have no way to know how genuinely
valuable it is to allow people to have the liberty to choose amongst a set
of D-values. If only one of the set of seven D-values is, in fact, an Nvalue, then the liberty to choose among the whole range of seven is seen
in a quite different light than would be the case if it were true that all
seven of the D-values were N-values. Bracketing for the moment the
issue of whether there is value in choice itself, separate from the issue of

6. “Any obvious” as used here is a hedge to take account of the fact that a set of
particular contextual factors, including extreme pressures on the survival of the polity,
might provide such a justification.
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whether the choices involve genuinely valuable goods, it certainly would
seem that there is a significant difference in the two cases. Limiting the
liberty of choice in the case of one N-value and six D-values that lack
genuine value would seem to be less objectionable—perhaps far less—
than limiting the liberty of choice amongst a plurality of genuinely good
choices. So how can we know how to value the liberty of choice—or at
least value it overall—if we do not know whether we are dealing with Dvalues or N-values?
B. The Slippage Between D-Pluralism and N-Pluralism
One key reason it appears that value pluralism and liberalism are
mutually supportive is that it seems like value pluralism is naturally
capacious when it comes to respecting the legitimacy of different
conceptions of the good and ways of life. It is easy to imagine that if we
affirm the idea of value pluralism, then we are affirming the legitimacy
of difference on a “broad” or “wide” scale. Consider this passage from
Galston—where the term moral pluralism is standing in for value
pluralism:
I need not dwell on the relationship between expressive liberty and moral
pluralism. Suffice it to say that if moral pluralism is the most nearly adequate
depiction of the moral universe we inhabit, then the range of choiceworthy
human lives is very wide. While some ways of life can be ruled out as violating
minimum standards of humanity, most cannot. If so, then the zone of human
agency protected by the norm of expressive liberty is capacious indeed.7

I agree with the judgments stated by Galston in this passage—there are a
great many choiceworthy ways to lead a good human life—but when I
try to reflect on why I believe this and how I might try to defend the
view to someone skeptical about it, I gradually lose confidence that the
idea of value pluralism itself would be of much help. The key reason is
simple: the form of the idea of value pluralism is not robust enough, not
pregnant enough in meaning, if you will, to yield these conclusions.
“Value pluralism” tells us about plurality and incommensurability, but it
does not tell us about how much plurality and about how deep and
confusing and befuddling it might be. Without that kind of supplement,
I cannot see that the thesis of value pluralism itself can do much work
for us. Is the idea of value pluralism adequate in the real world of
diverse ways of living valuable human lives, what we might call Nlives? How could we even begin to answer until we have on hand some
notion of what the contours of N-lives are? And how could the idea of
value pluralism itself give us that? I cannot see that from the mere
7.
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stipulation that value pluralism is the correct account of value, we can
conclude that the “range of choiceworthy human lives is very wide.” I
do not have an alternative to offer in defense of Galston’s proposition
with which I acknowledge agreeing; but I do not think the idea of value
pluralism can be the kind of justification we need.
The range of D-values and conceptions of the good in contemporary
societies that respect expressive liberty is, I grant, wide. But, value
pluralism is not about D-value, and nothing in the idea of value
pluralism itself necessitates that the range of N-value that is the heart of
value pluralism be wide, or indeed similar, to the range of D-value.
Crowder is very clear about this distinction. He explicitly distinguishes
“plurality of belief” from value pluralism:
[V]alue pluralism is not mere “plurality of belief,” the idea that different people
or groups of people believe different things. This latter is the usual sense
attached to the word “pluralism” in contemporary political theory. But value
pluralism in the sense that concerns me is not an empirical claim about the
nature of current belief. Rather, it is a claim about the true nature of morality
independently of what some people may happen to believe. . . . Consequently
my argument that value pluralism grounds a case for liberalism should not be
confused with the familiar claim that liberalism is justifiable as the most
sensible response to modern divergence of belief about the good life.8

That marks clearly the difference between D-value and N-value. Yet
Crowder also sometimes talks about N-value and the idea of value
pluralism as if it were safe to assume that the range of allowable values
and conceptions of the good encompassed by it were expansive. For
example, in defining the idea of plurality in value pluralism, he says that
“the things that are valuable for human beings—including both universal
and local values—are plural, or several. Many different goods are
required for human flourishing, not just one or a few . . . .”9 I agree with
these judgments, but cannot see that the idea of value pluralism actually
does much to support them. Even if we accept that as a matter of
definition, value pluralism means there are many goods required for
human flourishing, and not just one or a few, it would seem that the
important substantive question is what these goods are. Now a supporter
of value pluralism might say, “Well, of course such substantive
knowledge—or our best estimate of it—is essential to political
theorizing here, but we never said that such a supplement was not

8.
9.

CROWDER, LIBERALISM, supra note 2, at 3.
Id. at 2 (emphasis omitted).
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necessary. Your criticism is unfair if you take us to be claiming that the
formal idea of value pluralism itself could do that much work. Of
course it could not, but we never claimed it could.” I take the force of
this reply, but my worry is that the formal idea of value pluralism is not
doing any real work at all. I think it often seems to only because we slip
into supposing that there is a fairly robust correspondence between the
range of politically significant D-values in the empirical polity under
consideration and the range of N-values encompassed by the right
account of value pluralism, whatever it is. But there is no reason to
suppose that.
C. Galston’s Value Pluralism Argument Against
Single-Solution Illiberalism
Consider the argument that value pluralism supports liberalism in the
following way. Galston writes:
Value pluralism suggests that there is a range of indeterminacy within which
various choices are rationally defensible, at least in the sense that they all fall
above the Hampshire-Hart line of minimum decency. Because there is no
single uniquely rational ordering or combination of such values, no one can
provide a generally valid reason, binding on all individuals, for a particular
ranking or combination. There is, therefore, no rational basis for restrictive
policies whose justification includes the assertion that there is a unique rational
ordering of value. If value pluralism is correct, then as Steven Lukes puts it,
“For the state to impose any single solution on some of its citizens is thus (not
only from their standpoint) unreasonable.”10

Consider two points. First, the argument seems sound, but I do not see
that it has much real significance in establishing the connection between
value pluralism and liberalism. We are assuming here that liberalism is
constituted by the state refusing to impose on its citizens any single
solution regarding value because it would be unreasonable to do so
given the truth of value pluralism. However, this argument would not
reach states that imposed a single solution on grounds other than that
solution being uniquely rational. Many such grounds seem available; for
example, the claim that the solution is in accord with the deepest and
most important traditions of the community, or that it is a good way of
maintaining social solidarity and therefore security. It may even be,
supposing the single solution is being sustained rather than invented, that
the solution is an instantiation of “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.”
Moreover, suppose that the single solution being imposed is an N-value.
It is true that value pluralism tells us that at least one other N-value must

10. GALSTON, LIBERAL PLURALISM: IMPLICATIONS, supra note 2, at 57–58 (footnote
omitted).
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be being ignored, or repressed, in such a case, but the state would have
some fairly powerful things to say in its own defense. After all, it can
give a reason for its imposition of the single value, and a pretty
impressive reason—the value it is imposing is good, genuinely good, an
N-value.
Can we legitimately complain about value pluralism that it
dangerously licenses this sort of reply by the single solution state insofar
as it affirms the objective idea of the rational good, though insisting that
this good is in fact a plurality of goods? I do not think we can. From the
fact that someone subscribes to the view that values are objective and
plural, I do not believe we can conclude anything about that person’s
political principles or actions. The same applies to state activity, it
seems to me. Because value is objective, it does not follow that we have
to think it is a good idea to allow the state to act on the basis of appeal to
that objective knowledge. There is a long list of familiar reasons to
which liberals and others have long appealed in this respect. First and
foremost would be the doubt that the state has any particular expertise in
knowing these objective truths, coupled with the thought that it or its
agents have powerful—and hence dangerous to citizens—incentives to
feign knowledge of such truths when they actually fail to possess it.
Locke’s A Letter Concerning Toleration constitutes a canonical expression
of this argument.11 Note, however, that every argument used to defend
value pluralism against such a charge can also be used to defend value
monism. There is no difference between them in terms of appealing to a
notion of the objective rational good. If that is a politically dangerous
idea, then value pluralists are hardly any less threatening, simply as
value pluralists, than monists are. And if it is not a politically
threatening idea, then value pluralists are off the hook, but so are
monists.
Still, even if it is correct to think that Galston’s argument above is
limited in its reach and significance, it may be responded that his
argument does engage and defeat one line of defense of nonliberalism,
and a not insignificant one at that. It seems to me plausible to interpret
communist tyrannies as forms of polity that, at least sometimes,
purported to justify themselves with the claim that their impositions, on
what Galston terms the “expressive liberty” of citizens, represented the

11. JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (1689), reprinted in 35
GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 1, 17 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952).
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rational truth about human value.12 Such a claim cannot be rendered
consistent with value pluralism. On the other hand, value pluralism does
not do much by way of insuring nontyranny either, unless we are
presupposing that the range of objective values encompassed by the true
account of value pluralism is an extensive one. If there are many Nvalues, then a state imposing the single solution must be ignoring many
of them, and presumably preventing people from living in accordance
with them. But, whether there are many or few N-values, not to mention
what they actually are, is not something we can learn from value
pluralism as such.
D. Value Pluralism Between Monism and Relativism
Value pluralism is commonly portrayed as a view that is an alternative
to both monism and relativism. Yet it is, when one thinks about it, a
somewhat odd contrast. The key difference between value pluralism and
monism is over the issue of whether the good is best understood as
unitary or plural, but the key difference between value pluralism and
relativism is over the issue of whether the good—whether plural or
unitary—is objectively real or a matter of subjective taste or preference.
There are two separate questions at issue here, not one question with
three possible answers.
We might describe the rhetorical stage upon which value pluralism
makes its appearance this way. Traditionally, there are two fundamentally
opposed positions in metaethics. One, moral realism, maintains that the
nature of the good is properly understood as an objective matter. Inquiry
into the question of the good for human beings is rational inquiry into
the nature of reality, an attempt to discern what is truly and genuinely
good for human beings as such. This goodness is understood to be
something different than a simple description of what people believe,
feel, perceive, or otherwise subjectively announce to be good; it is what
really is good, whatever people may believe or prefer. It is, in that
sense, objective. Opposed to this view about morality is the relativist
view. On this view, there is no such objectively real truth about moral
matters to be discerned. Beliefs about the good, moral beliefs generally,
are properly understood as relative to some feature of the believer: his or
her environment, social position, cultural identity, and so on. Such
beliefs do not admit of rational demonstration as something objectively
true.
Now in the history of Western philosophy, each position, rhetorically
speaking, has a particular vulnerability. The relativist position has been
12.
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attacked since Plato for failing to take morality seriously—at best—and
contributing to the development of bad moral character and the
consequent corruption of society—anything goes—at worst. 13
Rhetorical attacks on the poor character of contemporary postmodernists
are the current version of this age-old discourse. On the other hand, the
moral realists are vulnerable to the charge of intellectual narrowmindedness—at best—or the practical, political analogue of this—
tyranny—at worst. They can be portrayed as narrow and pretentious in
claiming to know what is good for human beings and practically
dangerous insofar as they are moved to want to impose this alleged truth
on recalcitrant human beings for their own good. Now it is always
possible to bite the bullet as an exponent of one of these positions, and to
embrace the negative description of your enemy as your own. Consider,
for example, Richard Rorty’s artful rhetorical performances in the
service of relativism14 or, on the other hand, the rhetorical stance of
those fundamentalists, religious or secular, who are intent upon making
all of us an offer we cannot refuse. But for the most part, the dominant
rhetorical response to the tension between the two positions is to affirm
one while in one way or another denying that it actually is as vulnerable
as it might appear to the bad consequences alleged to be endemic to it by
adherents of the other positions. So most relativists decline the “Rorty
option” and instead prefer to go about demonstrating that they are not
really the bad people the objectivists say they are, while most
objectivists decline the fundamentalist option and insist instead that your
freedom is safe with them, indeed perhaps only with them as opposed to
those untrustworthy relativists. Rhetorically, the weakness of each of
these dominant responses is that they implicitly concede the case of their
opponent. The “responsible” relativist thereby acknowledges that there
may well be something wrong with irresponsibility, and the
nontyrannical objectivist has conceded that tyranny is something to be
avoided. So, there is plenty of fuel left to ignite the traditional forms of
the rhetorical attack of each position upon the other. Every relativist
who demonstrates his own responsibility ensures that two of his cousins
will be tarred and feathered as irresponsible, and every objectivist who
demonstrates his open-mindedness and tolerance condemns his kin to
the age-old charges.

13.
14.

See generally PLATO, GORGIAS (Donald J. Zeyl trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1987).
RORTY, supra note 5.
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Value pluralists occupy what appears to be a happy medium here.
They take morality seriously, while at the same time recognizing that
plurality is real and not merely apparent. They are serious like the
objectivists, but not vulnerable to the charge of tyranny; after all, they
recognize that the good is not monistic, but diverse. And, unlike the
relativist, they cannot be charged with irresponsibility. They, after all,
take morality to be every bit as objective as the objectivist does. Still,
there are questions that linger.
First, how different are value pluralists from monists? The big
difference between value pluralists and relativists is that value pluralists
affirm the objectivity of the plural account of the good they endorse. So
do monists. Traditionally, one of the most effective lines of argument
advanced by relativists against monists is what might be labeled the
“epistemological challenge.” Like the man from Missouri, the relativists
challenge the monists to “show me.” Monists are asked not simply to
express their endorsement of the position that the good is a matter of
objective knowledge, but to demonstrate it. This is notoriously difficult
to do. Reasonable people disagree not only about whether it can be
done, but whether it has been done. I have nothing to say directly to this
issue. Rather, I want to point out something that I think is important,
though easily overlooked, in discussions of value pluralism. The
epistemological challenge facing the value pluralist is every bit as great
as that facing the monist, however great one may assess that challenge to
be. The difficulty of demonstrating the objective goodness of some
plural number of ways of life or values is no less difficult than that of
demonstrating the objective goodness of what some monists claim is the
single best way of life. It is not true that the challenge is greater for the
monist than it is for the value pluralist.
Value pluralists commonly invoke illustrative examples of arguably
good lives in the course of explaining their ideas. So, for example, it
might be said that the life of the (a) Christian saint and that of the (b)
Homeric warrior are two objectively valuable modes of life, and that the
pluralist has the advantage over the monist insofar as he can recognize
this. A monist would have to defend the view that (a) is good and (b) is
not, or that (b) is good and (a) is not, or that neither (a) nor (b) is good,
though some (c) is. What about the value pluralist? True, he does not
have to deny the goodness of either (a) or (b), but he does have to defend
the view that both (a) and (b) are objectively good and not bad. This
seems to me no less difficult, epistemologically, than the challenge
facing the monist.
A second, and related, issue is that the notion of a plurality of
objectively good lives would, ultimately, have to be specified and
defended in a way that again seems every bit as demanding as the
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philosophical task confronting the monist. The plurality of good lives
entertained by the pluralist is finite. Not all ways of life/values are good,
and ultimately the pluralist owes an account of how to demarcate the line
between the two and how to know which particular lives/values fall on
either side of the line. Another way to put it is this: there is a great
plurality of possible value pluralisms, depending on the number and the
substance of the true values posited. From the point of view of a
concern with principles of right political order, almost everything hinges
on these features of the particular brand of value pluralism under
consideration. Very little if anything actually hinges on the general
nature of value pluralism itself.
IV. CROWDER’S DIVERSITY ARGUMENT FROM VALUE
PLURALISM TO LIBERALISM
Along with Galston, George Crowder has made the most sustained
particular efforts at defending the connection between value pluralism
and liberalism. In this section, I consider one key line of argument that
Crowder develops in his attempt to establish the connection. This is the
“diversity argument,” and Crowder divides it into two steps, each of
which I will now consider. The first draws an “ethic of diversity” from
the core idea of value pluralism. The second then moves from that ethic
to a set of liberal political principles.
A. From Value Pluralism to Diversity
Crowder reasons that “[t]o accept value pluralism is to accept that there
are universal goods and that these are many and incommensurable.”15
Further, he argues that to “accept” the existence of these goods is not
merely to “allow” them, but also to “endorse” them.16 This makes sense
because while we might, pragmatically, have to allow a range of Dgoods as a practical necessity, we would not think that constituted a
reason to endorse or support them. The fact that they were N-goods,
however, would be such a reason. As Crowder puts it, “from the
pluralist point of view, the universal goods are not merely values that, a
matter of fact, some people happen to hold. Rather, the pluralist sees

15.
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them as goods that contribute to human flourishing objectively.”17 He
then argues that because value pluralists are committed to human
flourishing, they must be committed to “promoting the various goods
that contribute to that flourishing.”18 This, too, seems a legitimate move,
though a potential problem begins to emerge here. Given the plural
nature of the good, we know that the value pluralist will have more than
one way in which he can “promote” flourishing. Moreover, we know
that he will not be able to directly compare and “weigh” these various
possibilities because of the reality of incommensurability. There is no
metric by which competing packages of objective goods, all of which
can be said to contribute to human flourishing, can be comparatively
weighed. So someone committed to flourishing will know that he
should promote objective goods and not bads, but he will not know
which goods, or package of goods, to promote, at least in any abstract
and generally applicable way.
B. The Equal Value Postulate
The next step in the argument invites more questions. Crowder argues
that “[f]urthermore, the pluralist must endorse all such goods equally, in
the sense that they have an equal claim on us until we are presented with
a particular context in which we must choose among them.”19 In effect,
the point is that incommensurability prevents us from having a rational
basis for choice amongst goods, or from knowing which goods are most
conducive to human flourishing. Only knowledge of the context,
historical and social, within which the choice is being made would give
us some potential guidance about how to proceed. It seems to me that
the proper way to describe the state of affairs here is to say that we have
no reason to attach any comparative value to any of the objective goods,
not to say that we have reason to value them equally. In effect, we have
no reason to value them equally or unequally. The point may seem
merely semantic, but I think it is more significant than that.
Crowder is certainly aware of the potential difficulty here. He writes:
“The plural goods are incommensurable, and so cannot be said to be
equal according to any measure, but they are, as Berlin puts it, ‘equally
ultimate.’”20 No explanation is given of this idea of Berlin’s that the
goods are “equally ultimate.” I was puzzled by this apparently
nonmetrical notion of equal valuation of each good that is based on their
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status as “ultimate.” Checking the context of Berlin’s passage—which
comes from the famous Two Concepts of Liberty essay—to which
Crowder refers here does not help much. Berlin is there emphasizing the
“necessity and agony” of choice amongst “equally ultimate” values,
arguing that this explains why “men place such immense value upon the
freedom to choose.”21 Knowing—insofar as they are value pluralists—
that the values cannot be reconciled and mutually realized in a possible
utopian situation, men, as Berlin portrays them here, insist upon the
value of being able to choose for themselves which set of irreconcilable
values they will pursue. But as I read him, the point is about the
“ultimacy” of these allegedly “equally ultimate” values, and the agony
of the tragic choices that follow, rather than about their “equality” in a
sense that would stand as an argument for the position Crowder is
defending. It is of course possible that I have missed a relevant sense of
equal that is actually there in either Crowder’s or Berlin’s formulation.
Still, the incommensurability postulate of value pluralism would seem to
undercut a general attribution of equality to a range of values.
The significance of the equal value postulate in terms of Crowder’s
overall argument can be seen in the next step of his argument. He says
that from their status of being valued equally, “[i]t follows that the
pluralist outlook commits us to valuing the full range of human
goods.”22 This is a crucial step. The argument is going to require us to
endorse a larger rather than a smaller range of objective goods—Ngoods. But it is not clear why this should be so. We are interested in the
way in which these goods contribute to human flourishing, and we have
no way to know that “more is better” when it comes to N-goods.
Incommensurability prevents that. It might be that endorsing a package
of N-goods (X) that is “larger” than another package (Y) would
contribute to human flourishing to a greater degree. However, only if
we knew that the values were metrically equal would it become
plausible to entertain the idea that more is better. Without the equal
value postulate, we would not have a case for endorsing a “larger”
package of values over a “smaller” one, and without that endorsement, a
crucial link in the chain of argument is endangered. Crowder will argue
that liberalism does a better job than alternative political views of

21. ISAIAH BERLIN, TWO CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY (1958), reprinted in LIBERTY 166,
213–14 (Henry Hardy ed., 2002).
22. CROWDER, LIBERALISM, supra note 2, at 137.
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fulfilling the aim of “valuing the full range of human goods.”23 I will
argue later that there are problems with this spatial way of conceiving
liberalism. But even if it were to prove sound, we would not have a
reason for thinking that the best political system is one that protects the
“widest” or “largest” set of human values, unless we also had reason to
accept the equal value postulate. The best political system will
presumably be one that promotes human flourishing to a degree greater
than the alternatives at hand. But, we will not be able to know what
flourishing is and how well it is promoted by looking at the range or
number of values that a given polity endorses or secures. We are stuck
with the difficulty of looking at the substance of what is promoted and
foregone.
Crowder does provide another reason, separate from the equal value
postulate, in support of his view that value pluralism leads to valuing
diversity. He writes:
To acknowledge the truth of value pluralism is to acknowledge a multiplicity of
genuine goods, of diverse natures, not merely ethical mistakes with which it is
nevertheless best not to interfere. It is to acknowledge a duty to promote those
goods so far as possible: a duty to promote diversity.24

This makes it seem as if the critic were denying the value-pluralism-todiversity link because the critic denied the objective goodness—the Ngoodness—of the various goods at hand. But the criticism I am raising
does not deny this. Rather, the point is that we have no reason to believe
that flourishing is better supported by the endorsement of a wider rather
than a less wide range of N-goods in a particular society. The issue of
the goods themselves being objective and not mere ethical mistakes is
beside the point.
C. Maximization and Coherence
In denying the equal value postulate, I am questioning whether one
can generate a value pluralist defense of diversity that is, as it were,
quantitative and nonsubstantive. Because we cannot know that more is
better in terms of promoting human flourishing, we cannot build a
defense of liberal political principles on the idea that liberalism is
superior to alternative political theories because it is “wider,” “more
spacious,” “more open,” or “less restrictive.” I will label this idea the
“spatial” conception of liberalism. One attraction of the spatial idea is
that it seems to provide a means of defending liberalism without
invoking substantive claims about the good. I do not think the spatial
23.
24.
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idea of liberalism is an illuminating one, and I do not think that defenses
of liberalism that appeal to it are attractive ones.
Crowder is aware of this problem and does present an interesting
argument to counter it. I am skeptical that the argument succeeds.
Crowder acknowledges that “[a]n ethic that consisted merely in
maximizing the number of values to be pursued would be hard to
distinguish from other maximization ethics. . . . Such an ethic would be
in conflict with the fundamental pluralist injunction to attend to the
distinctiveness of values.”25 He continues:
This would be a serious problem if the ethic of diversity I am proposing
amounted merely to an injunction to promote “more rather than fewer” values
or “as many as possible.” But this kind of quantitative consideration—how
many values?—is only one aspect of what I have in mind. The maximizing
dimension of the ethic of diversity must be supplemented by a second kind of
consideration, that of balance or coherence among the values to be promoted.
Sheer multiplication of different goods must be tempered by attention to the
content of those goods and to the relations among them, since some may impede
others. The diversity implied by pluralism is therefore best understood as
involving both a quantitative and a qualitative element, both a requirement of a
generous range of values and a requirement that the values within that range
should be tolerably coherent with one another. The ethic of diversity embraces
both “multiplicity” and “coherence.”26

From this it might seem that Crowder has abandoned the spatial
defense of liberalism and acknowledged the unavoidable substantive
nature of the question of the good. However, “coherence” turns out
itself to be, on Crowder’s rendering, a kind of supplement to the
maximizing idea rather than an actual departure from it. Let me explain
by advancing two doubts about the argument above.
First, note that the maximizing aspect of the diversity argument is not
abandoned, but is instead reaffirmed in this passage. It is not maximizing
that is identified as the problem, but maximizing unsupplemented by
considerations of coherence. But the burden of the previous section was
to argue that no coherent account of what it could mean to maximize
incommensurable values can be given here, once we reject the equal
value postulate. In this passage, Crowder introduces the notion of value
pluralism “involving” a requirement of a “generous range of values,” but
“generous” is here functioning as another spatial term that is

25.
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unfounded.27 Whether a “generous” range of values is more conducive
to human flourishing than an “ungenerous” range is an unanswerable
question. It depends on the substance of the values in question and upon
the nature of the relations between them. Crowder does, it is true,
recognize that last point insofar as he introduces the necessity of
attending to “coherence” among values when evaluating alternatives, but
the point I wish to emphasize here is that the fact that coherence should
be taken into account does not give us a reason for taking multiplicity
into account. In other words, if, as I hold, the maximizing idea of
multiplicity is groundless from a pluralist point of view, it does not
become any more grounded or persuasive because it is supplemented by
another criterion—coherence. However strong the case for coherence
may be, and I agree that it is a strong one, it does not strengthen the case
for multiplicity. In my view, the alleged pluralist case for multiplicity
remains ungrounded.
Second, there is a peculiarity about the idea that the criterion of
coherence adds a qualitative element to the otherwise quantitative nature
of the multiplicity criterion. The core idea behind the coherence
criterion is the recognition that “the content of the values pursued must
fit together within a horizon of real possibility for the individual or
society concerned, given the person’s or the society’s experience and
identity.”28 Moreover, “in addition to being realistic prospects, the
values in question should not be so widely scattered or fragmented that
their pursuit can only be half-hearted or self-defeating. The goods
should therefore cohere sufficiently that all may be taken seriously.”29
Let us call these the “practicality” and “nonfragmentary” conditions of
the criterion of coherence. Now both conditions make good sense.
However, the problem is that they are so reasonable that they undermine
any appeal that the maximizing criterion of multiplicity has. In other
words, the conditions of coherence introduced by Crowder may serve to
undermine the quantitative criterion, not serve as a supplement to it.
This is because the conditions of coherence are sensible just because
they show us that it is not the range—in terms of quantitative space—of
values that matters, but rather the degree to which a given range—
whatever its absolute spatial extent—has enough practicality and unity
to lead to human flourishing to a greater degree than some alternative
range.
Now that last statement sounds as if it invokes a quantitative
concept—“greater or lesser flourishing”—but I am not sure that it does.
27.
28.
29.
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Flourishing is the conceptual term Crowder has chosen to designate the
end-state that we are pursuing in terms of deciding which values to
support as social evaluators, and the crucial point about it is precisely
that it is nonquantitative, while nevertheless being objective. We cannot
figure out how to “maximize” flourishing; in a way, the use of
flourishing is itself testimony to this fact. We could imagine maximizing
“utility” or some other commensurating concept, but as value pluralists,
we have to eschew the use of such concepts. Flourishing is the peculiar
concept with which we are left. It is a concept trying to perform two
functions at once. It commensurates at a very high level of abstraction
lower level concepts that are supposed to be incommensurable—so it
both “commensurates” and “fails to commensurate” at once. Speaking
of flourishing commensurates insofar as it implies that different
packages of values can be comparatively assessed in terms of the twin
criteria of multiplicity and coherence to determine which package better
supports the end-state of flourishing. But it fails to commensurate
insofar as we realize that we cannot carry these comparative evaluations
out in any kind of quantifiable or quantifying way. Value pluralism is
consistent with the idea that we can distinguish the good from the bad,
but it does not seem to me consistent with the idea that we can
distinguish the greater from the lesser amount of good.
Crowder comes close to acknowledging the way in which coherence
undermines rather than supplements multiplicity when he describes what
remains of the criterion of multiplicity once we grant that considerations
of coherence must be taken into account. He writes:
[T]he ideal of diversity implied by the pluralist outlook cannot be captured
solely by the idea of maximizing a range of values. Once again there is a need
for choices to be made, choices that require guidance of a qualitative nature.
That is not to say that considerations of quantity are irrelevant to pluralist
diversity, since the narrowing of available values to a very small range is
clearly at variance with the pluralist outlook. Pluralist diversity implies support
for at least some generous range of goods as available goals for individuals and
societies.30

For all intents and purposes, this final formulation leaves the criterion
of multiplicity empty. Even granting Crowder’s qualifying point that
“[w]hat exactly that range should be is, of course, not something that can
be expressed in a precise formula applicable to all cases,”31 it is hard to
30.
31.
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see what evaluative work the criteria could actually do. The “very small
range” of values that would definitively violate the criteria is, in effect,
the range of one, that is, monism. For we cannot know that a range of
even only two values would be inferior in terms of promoting human
flourishing to some alternative set of more than two; the quantitative
comparison will simply not tell us what we need to know. Crowder is
right in my view to introduce the qualitative criterion of coherence into
the discussion, but wrong in holding that the quantitative criterion of
multiplicity can be sustained once this introduction is made. Value
pluralism, it seems to me, teaches us that the question of the good is
qualitative “all the way down.”32
My conclusion is that the connection between value pluralism and
diversity maintained by Crowder does not hold up. The equal value
postulate cannot be used to sustain the view that more is better when it
comes to the relation between quantity of values and human flourishing.
The coherence criteria, I have argued, serves to undermine rather than
supplement or support the view that the width of the range of values
endorsed in a society is an indicator of the degree to which that society
enables human flourishing.
D. From Diversity to Liberalism
Suppose that I am wrong and Crowder is right about the relationship
between value pluralism and diversity. Let us examine the second step
in his argument from diversity in support of the view that value
pluralism generates a case for liberalism. This is the claim that the
principle of diversity generates a case for liberalism. I want to consider
this argument in detail because I believe it constitutes an example of the
spatial form of argument that I fear does not serve liberalism well. The
essence of it is to try to defend liberalism not by means of affirming
substantively the type of human life or lives to which it predominantly
gives rise—as superior to some alternative set yielded by an alternative
form of political order—but rather by claiming that liberalism is in some
spatial sense—“wider,” “broader,” “more capacious,” “less restraining,”
“open,” et cetera—more appropriately accommodating of diversity than
its rivals, however defined. In short, it is a form of argument that
appeals to quantity as a substitute for qualitative judgment about the
good when comparatively evaluating political orders. I am skeptical that
any such argument can ultimately be sustained.
Crowder’s form of the spatial argument is a thoughtful one. He
frames the defense of the liberal political order as a respecter of diversity
32.
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in terms of its “‘approximate[]’ neutral[ity].”33 Approximate neutrality
is a more modest version of whole neutrality. Crowder criticizes the
doctrine of whole neutrality. Whether whole neutrality is conceived as
neutrality of impact of policy upon different ways of life or as neutrality
of reasons justifying political policy, it is a highly unlikely possibility in
Crowder’s view: “[I]t is doubtful whether any form of liberalism can be
wholly neutral, either in impact or reasons.”34 Note, though, that
Crowder does not conceive neutrality as an impossibility, but rather as a
highly unlikely but nevertheless coherent empirical possibility. Whole
neutrality in his view is possible but highly unlikely; hence, it makes
sense to imagine it as a desired endpoint that one could approach to a
greater or lesser degree. His defense of liberalism is in terms of such an
approach. He claims that liberalism, while certainly not wholly neutral,
is nevertheless “‘approximately’ neutral, that is, more neutral or
accommodating than the alternative political forms.”35 Liberalism, he
claims, “provides the best political framework because it leaves more
space for the flourishing of multiple and diverse goods than any known
or realistically imagined alternative.”36 In a similar formulation, he says
that:
The pluralist ethic of diversity can realistically require no more than that the
political ranking endorsed by a given society be as accommodating to diversity
as possible in the circumstances and more accommodating than the alternatives.
Liberals should concede that liberalism is not unlimited in its capacity to
accommodate diversity, but they can plausibly argue that the diversity ethic is
more fully satisfied by liberal principles and institutions than by any other.37

Does liberalism provide more “space” in the requisite sense than any
“known or realistically imagined alternative”? Crowder’s answer is yes,
but I am skeptical, not so much because I think the answer is no as
because I am not sure it is the right question.
The space we are metaphorically speaking of here is space for the
plural good, that is to say, space for N-goods. We are imagining not the
space available for alternative values and modes of life generally, that is,
D-goods, but rather the space available for that subset of this general set
that we know to be objectively good. Now there is, I think, a certain
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level of plausibility to the “liberalism provides more space” idea when
we are talking about the general category of D-values without regard to
their objective goodness or badness. I grant the general idea that liberal
political orders are, relatively speaking, morally permissive, and the
public/private split—in whatever particular historical configuration it
takes and however fragmented it may be—characteristic of such orders
can be understood as generating space available for individuals to pursue
different D-conceptions of a valuable life. But this is space for the
morally bad as well as for the morally good; let us say, for “B”conceptions of the good—morally bad conceptions of the good—as well
as for N-conceptions. The fact, if it is one, that liberalism provides
“more space” in this sense does not give us reason to conclude that the
good of human flourishing is served by liberalism and the space it
provides relative to an alternative. To know that, we would need to have
substantive knowledge of the nature of the good—plural and objective—
and we would need to see how well liberalism did relative to alternatives
in terms of nurturing it. The point is that knowing that liberalism
provides more space for value choice of D-goods than an alternative
does not help us to know whether liberalism is more supportive of
human flourishing, that is, N-goods, than that alternative. After all, that
liberal space might enable more flowers to bloom, but it might also
enable more weeds to grow, some of which might prevent flowers from
growing. So in this case, the spatial idea of liberalism is—or so I have
suggested—conceptually plausible, but unhelpful in terms of providing a
reason in support of liberalism.
On the other hand, consider the spatial idea in the context of thinking
about the subset of N-values only, not the general set of all D-values.
Here, the spatial idea is conceptually implausible. How could we know
that liberalism provides more space for the N-good than that provided by
some alternative political order? Nothing about the spatial attributes of
liberalism—or its alternatives—could help us to know this. The thing
that would help us to make an evaluation such as this would be
substantive knowledge of the good—knowledge about which values and
ways of life purported to be good by various individuals and groups
actually were objectively good. The spatial idea of liberalism would add
nothing to this. Here again, we have no reason to think that more is
necessarily better. Only if we believed that allowing quantitatively more
D-value choices tended to yield more good choices of N-value overall
would we have reason to affirm the spatial defense of liberalism from a
value pluralist point of view. But I do not see how we could know that,
especially if we had reason to think that the bad need not simply
peacefully coexist alongside the good, but might also thwart and inhibit
the development of the good. In short, and to repair to the gardening
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metaphor one last time, if we desire a flourishing garden, we will have to
do something other than look for the largest plot of land and grant
permission for a hundred flowers to bloom. Defending liberalism in
terms of its “approximate neutrality” while criticizing the idea of “whole
neutrality” is like saying that even if the best garden is not infinitely
large, the larger garden is the better garden. But size and quantity are
not the appropriate tools of evaluation here.
Moreover, spatial concepts are no more effective as criticisms of
alternatives to liberalism than they are as pillars of support for it.
Crowder defends liberalism indirectly by arguing that it responds to the
truth of pluralist diversity in a balanced way that makes it superior to the
extremes of too little concern for diversity—this is said to be the vice of
a number of political views, including Marxism, anarchism, socialism,
communitarianism, and conservatism—or a wanton overconcern for
diversity—said to be the vice of postmodernism. Liberalism, on the
other hand, is said to have “a strong claim to be seen as striking the
required balance between multiplicity and coherence, and therefore to
satisfying the requirements of pluralist diversity.”38 There is much to be
said, and much of great interest that has been said, both for and against
these various political views; in a sense, the consideration of them, in all
of their substantive detail, is a considerable part of the traditional
enterprise of political theory. I cannot see that assessing them in the
spatial terms employed here is of much help in coming to a sustained
judgment about them—or about liberalism, for that matter. Thus, for
example, postmodernists are charged with “ethical incoherence” for
promiscuously “promoting multiple values without regard to what these
values are and how they relate to one another. . . . The fostering of
otherness or difference cannot by itself be an adequate criterion for
public policy.”39 On the other hand, conservatism is treated as guilty of
the opposite spatial vice, that of being overly narrow and insufficiently
broad in terms of its response to the truth of value pluralism. Crowder
portrays conservatives as confronting the dilemma of choice in the face
of value pluralism by repairing to an insistence “on an adherence to local
tradition which is excessively narrow.”40 Conservatives, like liberals
and unlike postmodernists, appreciate the need for coherence to temper

38.
39.
40.

Id. at 145.
Id. at 144–45.
Id. at 149.

881

NEAL FINAL ARTICLE

12/28/2009 10:52 AM

multiplicity when it comes to the question of responding to value
pluralism. Unlike liberals, however, conservatives, in appealing to local
tradition as the source of guidance in value choice, are said to “rest[] on
an unnecessarily narrow interpretation of the context required for
pluralist choice, and [are] neglectful of universal norms.” 41
Conservatives are thus mistaken insofar as they practice a “rigid
insistence on local tradition”—is it the rigidity that is the problem?—and
fail to realize that “[p]luralist diversity requires that limits be placed on
multiplicity, but existing traditions are not coextensive with those
limits.”42 So: conservatives are too narrow, and postmodernists are too
wide. Liberals are just right, spatially measured.
V. CONCLUSION
I have presented a number of arguments here that call into question
the strength of the linkage between value pluralism and liberal political
morality. I have focused attention on the idea of value pluralism, saying
little about the details of the idea of liberal political morality.
Ultimately, our overall view of the relationship between value pluralism
and liberalism would need to take full account of the plurality of
liberalisms. Galston’s “reformation” liberalism, for example, is quite
different from the enlightenment version of liberalism that privileges a
robust conception of individual autonomy.43 Crowder’s brand of
liberalism partakes of both strains and is interesting in its attempt to
synthesize them. Although I believe that Galston’s idea of a reformation
liberalism stressing tolerance over autonomy is the preferable model of
political liberalism, I have tried to explain here why I have doubt that the
idea of value pluralism is helpful in the articulation of liberalism of
whichever type.
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